Thanks Filip for your answer. Wouldn't it make sense to progressively
change this behavior, possibly controlled by a configuration option to give
clients time to handle this incompatible change?

Scanning quickly through the code I suspect the username and email fields
are systematically returned in the access token, regardless of the presence
of the openid scope (I still have to double check by actually testing it),
therefore disclosing some user identity without his/her consent.

Guillaume.

On Thu, Mar 31, 2016 at 3:03 PM, Filip Hanik <fhanik(a)pivotal.io> wrote:

The access token used to double down as an identity token before OpenID
Connect was standardized, now that we have implemented id_token, we don't
really need it. but removing it would cause an backwards incompatible
change.


Filip


On Thu, Mar 31, 2016 at 6:50 AM, Guillaume Berche <bercheg(a)gmail.com>
wrote:

Hi,

I wonder the rationale for apparenty uaa-specific [0] user-related
fields in the access token (username, email [1]) while they are now
returned in a standard maneer in the openidconnect id token.

Is it something that would change in the future ([2] seemed similar
decoupling) ? Or is it a standard practice that avoids clients to request
the idtoken to get access to basic user identity ?

Thanks in advance,

Guillaume.

ps: please let me know if such questions are better suited for a GH
issue on the UAA repo.

[0]
https://github.com/cloudfoundry/uaa/blob/master/docs/UAA-Tokens.md#getting-started

Some of these fields are described in the JSON web tokens

specification. However, the vendor may add additional fields, or
attributes, to the token itself.

[1]
https://github.com/cloudfoundry/uaa/blob/9b5c13d793ebfe358e26559cedc6b528a557b43f/server/src/main/java/org/cloudfoundry/identity/uaa/oauth/UaaTokenServices.java#L493-L497
[2] https://www.pivotaltracker.com/story/show/102090344

Guillaume.